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STATEME.NT OF THE CASE 
This appeal, simply stated, is to determine two 
questions of law: 
1. May a garnishment, after judgment, issue from 
a small claims court ~ 
2. May a corporation, through its credit manager, 
enter the small claims court, file an affidavit, testify, 
and proceed without an attorney~ 
This action is in essence a declaratory proceeding 
to guide litigants and courts in small claims actions as 
to their rights and duties. There is confusion. (R. 55) 
Some small claims courts in Utah issue garnishments; 
some do not. Some small claims courts allow corpora-
tions to proceed without counsel; others require lawyers 
to conduct the action. To dispel this confusion, this 
appeal is prosecuted in order to achieve an authorita-
tive determination. 
This is not an appeal from a decision in a small 
claims court. It is an ap·peal from a collateral attack, 
brought by the plaintiff-respondent below, in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, to enjoin the actions 
of the Murray City Court acting as a small claims court. 
In that action the interpretation of the statutes and 
rules are questioned and constitutional issues are raised. 
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STATEMENT OF T'HE FACTS 
Appellant, Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, here-
inafter called "Hi-Land", delivered milk to respondent, 
Tuttle, who failed to pay for same. Hi-Land thereupon 
brought an action in the Small 'Claims division of the 
Murray City Court. (R. 26) The credit manager of 
I-Ii-Land was Roy Harris, (R. 63, 67) who prepared the 
Affidavit (ex. 1-P) stating Tuttle owed Hi-Land $40.48 
for the merchandise. 
Upon process being served, and at the appointed 
date for trial, respondent Tuttle appeared and appel-
lant Harris testified for Hi-Land. No attorney was 
present. (R. 26) Both Tuttle and Harris were sworn, 
and testified. No one argued. 
" ... the Judge asked Mr. Tuttle if he owed 
the bill and Mr. Tuttle says 'I do,' and the Judge 
says, 'When are you going to pay it~' and Mr. 
Tuttle said, ... he would like a little time to pay 
the claim so the Judge asked him what he wanted 
and Tuttle said that he would like two payments 
to pay the claim." (R. 32-33) 
The Small Claims judge entered a judgment as 
prayed, allowing Tuttle to pay one-half on May 5, 1958 
and the rest on June 5, 1958, said judgment being en-
tered April 24, 1958. Exhibit 2-P is the docket showing 
procedures. (R. 34) 
"~lr. Tuttle placed himself on the mercy of 
the Court and agreed to pay one-half on the 5th 
day of June." (R. 51) 
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"He admitted that he owed the money and 
that he would pay it.'' (R. 63) 
When Tuttle didn't pay, on May 8, 1959, Houston, 
Clerk of the Court, issued a garnishment, and the docket 
shows it was returned on May 9. (Ex. 2P; R34) The 
Garnishe's Answer, showed money due to Tuttle from 
Kemp & Kelsey "for salary for payroll period ... " 
Appellant Houston as clerk of the court issued and 
served the garnishment and appellant Harris served the 
garnishee execution (R. 29) by which Kemp & Kelsey 
paid over to appellant Hi-Land $50.18. The Garnishee 
Execution form as it was p-repared and served is among 
the court's exhibits. It was on the basis of the garnishee 
execution, based on the judgment, that the collection 
was made. (R. 34) Thus the collection on the judgment 
was completed by May 23, 1995 as shown on exhibit 2-P, 
being the docket of the court. 
On May 27, 1959 respondent Tuttle filed a com-
plaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County against 
appellants Hi-Land, Harris, and Houston, thereby under-
taking collaterally to enjoin the Murray Small Claims 
court from issuing garnishments, enjoining Harris from 
taking action in that court e~cept through an attorney, 
and for a return of the $50.18 recovered by Hi-Land, 
among other things. (R. 1) 
After answers, the pretrial order reflected impor-
tant stipulations and the narrowing of the issues, (R. 16) 
and trial was had resulting in Findings of Fact and ·Con-
clusions of Law (R. 87) and a Judgment. (R. 91) Three 
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essential elements are reflected in the Findings, Con-
clusions and Judgment of the court, as follows: 
(1) Tuttle was given judgment for the return of 
the $50.18 that had been recovered in the Small Claims 
court earlier. 
(2) The clerk of the Small Claims court was per-
manently enjoined from issuing a garnishment out of 
that court. 
·(3 Appellants Hi-Land and Harris were perman-
ently enjoined from proceeding in the Small Claims 
court: Hi-Land could not p·roceed without an attorney, 
and Harris was held to be practicing law. (R. 91-92) 
This appeal is prosecuted by all of the appellants, 
not essentially because of any loss of the $50.18, as such, 
but in order to have determined the following: 
(a) May a corporation use the Small Claims 
court without the use of an attorney~ 
(b) May a garnishment issue out of the 
Small Claims court~ 
Appellants believe the trial court erred in its decision, 
and will undertake to show the errors committed. 
By the District Court finding that a corporation 
must use counsel, and that the Small Claims court ean-
not issue a garnishment, collection procedures to the 
people of the state of Utah are placed in great doubt. 
Appellant Hi-Land has been deprived of its property, 
to wit: the fruits of its collection against Tuttle. The 
statutes have been misconstrued. Due process of law 
has not been given Hi-Land. Hence this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A CORPORA-
TION MAY NOT PROCEED IN A SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
EXCEPT THRO·UGH AN ATTORNEY, AND THAT A COR-
P~ORATE CREDIT MANAGER PRACTICES LAW WHEN HE 
PURSUES A CASE THROUGH SMALL CLAIMS. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING A SMALL CLAIMS 
COURT FROM ISSUING A GARNISHMENT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ER.RED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO 
E'8PONDENT FOR $50.18 AND COSTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A CORPORA-
TION MAY NOT PRO·CEED IN A SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
EXCEPT THRO·UGH AN ATTORNEY, AND THAT A COR-
P·ORATE CREDIT MANAGER PRACTICES LAW WHEN HE 
PURSUES A CASE THROUGH SMALL CLAIMS. 
The Findings of the court say: 
"That a corporation of the State of Utah 
may not app-ear in the courts of this state in-
cluding the Small Claims Division of the Murray 
'City Court except through an attorney author-
ized and licensed to p·ractice ... " (R. 90) 
In this case it is clear that the Hi-Land corpora-
tion undertook to and did appear before the said Small 
Claims court and got judgment under its credit man-
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ager, Harris. Let it be clear that only procedures be-
fore the Small Claims courts are involved in this ap·peal. 
A real problem exists within the Small Claims courts 
of Utah: It appears that such courts in Richfield, 
Tooele, Moab, Ogden, and Murray, Utah, allow corpora-
tions to proceed in the manner followed by the Murray 
Small Claims court as here stated. In the Small Claims 
courts of Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah, corporations 
are not allowed to proced without counsel, and they do 
not issue garnishments. (R. 75) Hence the issues are 
of much deep.er significance than the immediate litigants. 
The Murray Small Calims court has from thirty to 
forty cases per month. (R. 38) 
Appellant Hi-Land files in its larger territory many 
such cases each month, as high as thirty or forty. (R. 31, 
67, 81) Many problems beset the corporation in making 
small collections, to be later adverted to, where it is 
uneconomic to proceed except through the credit man-
ager of the corporation. The statutes of Utah creating 
the Small Claims court gives the answer as to how to 
proceed. 
SMALL CLAIMS STATUTES 
The enactment came to Utah in 1933 (Laws of Utah 
1933, p. 28) as, in the early professorial language of 
Felix Frankfurter: "one of the most notable achieve-
ments of recent years in procedural reform -the small 
clailns courts ... " (37 Harv. L. Rev. 786) He stated 
there that the new, informal procedures were matters 
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"vital to the great masses, and vital to continued con-
fidence in law. The germ of the innovation is set forth 
in section 78-6-8 U·CA 1953 to the effect that "No formal 
pleading, other than the said affidavit and notice shall 
be necessary and the hearing and disposition of all such 
actions may be informal, w~th the sole object of dis-
pensing speedy justi~ce between the parties.'' The $50.00 
limit was extended by the 1953 amendment to $100.00. 
In the case at bar, we are struck with the funda-
mental proposition that a corporation cannot enter the 
Small Claims court except through a licensed attorney. 
Against this proposition, the matter of the issuance of 
garnishments is secondary, to be treated under a sub-
sequent head. 
The principal issue here is whether or not a cor-
poration is to be forced to enter this lowest of all courts 
solely through a lawyer. The issue involves sober con-
sideration to the bench and bar; there are implications 
that involve the public relations of the entire legal pro-
fession. The decision of this court requires a careful 
analysis of the public interest along with that of the 
bar. Much harm may be done without a careful weigh-
ing of subtle values. 
We do not find this court to have dealt with the 
Small Claims issue. This is a case of first impression. 
The Small Claims court is a "department" of the 
"Justice Court" according to the organic act creating 
it. 78-6-1 UCA 1953. The procedure for the action is 
stated in the following section 78-6-2: 
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"Actions may be maintained in the small 
claims court whenever any person app·ears before 
any justice of the peace or judge or clerk of a 
city court and executes an affidavit setting forth 
the nature and basis of the claim ... " 
Thus we are confronted first with the question: 
may a corporation enter the small claims court, through 
a person, to wit, its credit manager, and execute the 
required affidavti ~ At bar, appellant Harris executed 
the affidavit (exhibit 1-P R. 52) There was confusion 
in the Murray S'mall Claims court in the manner of 
stating the name of the plaintiff as being appellant 
I-Ii-Land, (R. 52, 53) but the p·retrial session ironed out 
these difficulties by finding that in truth and fact, the 
plaintiff was Hi-Land, to whom respondent Tuttle owed 
the money for milk delivered. (R. 17, 53) 
This court must examine the meaning of the words 
"any person" as used in 78-6-2. To say that it does not 
embrace a corporation would not make good law. Con-
stantly throughout our law the word person and cor-
poration are used interchangeably. "Person" is not a 
\vord of art as here used, we must contend. In 48 C. J. 
1038 it is said: the word person "is synonymous with 
party, or party to the action, or suit.'' Certainly we 
recognize a corporation as a party to an action. 
The word "person" never appears again in the 
organic small claims statute. Beginning with 78-6-3 it 
is changed to the word "claimant," which word is 
broader, and includes any person or entity having a 
c1aim to be proven, and would obviously embrace a 
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corporation. No one would argue tha.t a corporation 
could not be sued as defendant in the small claims act. 
There is nothing in the act being construed that pre-
cludes a corporation being a plaintiff. It would torture 
the practice of our courts to say that a corporation may 
not be plaintiff in a small claims action. No good would 
be served, and it would complicate. To say that a cor-
poration cannot sue in a small claims court would sug-
gest that it could assign its claim to an individual, who 
then would qualify as "any person" but this begs the 
question. By 78-6-6 u~CA 1953 : "No claim shall be filed 
or prosecuted in small claim court by an assignee of 
such claim." Thus we come to grips with the funda-
mental question earlier stated. There is no good reason 
that p·recludes a corporation from entering the small 
claims court. 
The basic theory of the small claims procedure is 
clearly stated in 78-6-8: 
"No formal pleading, other than the said affi-
davit and notice shall be necessary and the hear-
ing and disposition of all such actions may he 
informal, with the sole object of dispensing 
speedy justice between the parties.'' 
To ere·ct the block of prohibiting corporations from 
the small claims procedures is at once to inject formal-
ity, proscribed by the statute. The object is informality, 
speedy justice. GINTHER v. SOUTH\\TEST WORI(-
OVER CO. 286 SW 2d 291 at 295 will aid in finding 
that "ordinarily the term person includes a corpora-
tion," unless the legislative history, executive interpre-
10 
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tation or other aids to construction, clearly show some 
other intent. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Art. XII, 
sec. 4, secures rights and duties to corp,orations like 
unto natural persons : 
"The term 'corporation' as used in this arti-
cle, shall be construed to include all associations 
and joint-stock companies having any powers 
or privileges of corporations not possessed by 
individuals or partnerships, and all corporations 
shall have the right to sue, and shall be subject 
to be sued, in all courts, in like cases as natural 
persons.'' 
The word "person" seems to have no generic defini-
tion in our stwtutes. It is defined in thirteen separate 
sections shown at page 207 of the general index in vol. 
10 UCA 1953. Under the Declaratory Judgments act, 
at 78-33-13 the definition is quite typical: 
"The word 'person' whenever used in this 
chapter, shall be construed to mean any person, 
partnership, joint-stock company, unincorporated 
association or society, or municipal or other cor-
poration of any character whatsoever." 
To the same effect is the definition under Commerce 
and Trade, 13-2-20. 
In PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. v. SMALL CLAIMS 
COURT, 76 Cal App 2d adv. 465, 173 P.2d, 38 167 ALR 
820 the District Court of Appeals of California laid down 
the leading case in that jurisdiction, well annotated, and 
"rorthy of being followed here. It asks the question: 
11 
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"Is a corporation a 'p·erson' within the mean-
ing of this section~" 
One of the primary issues in the case at bar also 
includes that of whether an attorney may enter the 
small claims court. This excellent California decision 
shows that in that state the legislature prohibits at-
torneys from having anything to do with a small claims 
case, and the issue there was whether this deprived a 
litigant of due process. The Prudential case held: 
"It must be apparent that when #117 g pro-
vides that only the plaintiff and defendant may 
prosecute or defend such actions, and prohibits 
any 'other person' from so appearing, it did not 
intend to exclude, and by its language it does 
not exclude, a proper representative of the cor-
poration from appearing or defending such ac-
tions. The contended for interpretation would 
disregard the provisions of the c·onstitution and 
the Civil Code above quoted. Since corporations 
can only appear through some natural person it 
is obvious that the proper natural person may 
appear to prosecute or defend such claims, and 
that such a proper person is not an 'other person' 
excluded by #117 g." 
". . . Now who is a proper representative 
that may lawfully appear in such cases~ Obvi-
ously the members of the board of directors and 
other officers should be permitted to so appear 
. . . In the present case the foreign corpora-
tion did not have an officer or member of its 
board in California. It did have, however, a 
manager of its life business, who was also its 
statutory agent for service of all legal process 
in this s~tate. He, quite clearly, can appear on 
behalf of the corporation to defend the action. 
12 
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Just who else should be permitted to appear on 
behalf of the corporation is not entirely clear 
and could well be a subject for legislative action. 
In the absence of such action it would appear 
just and proper, that arvy regular employee not 
directly employed as a lawyer, but whose duties 
give him peculiar knowledge of the facts of such 
cases, could app·ear to represent the corpora-
tion, and this is so whether or not he is an at-
torney." 
The California Court came head on with the policy 
as to why attorneys were kept out of the small claims 
court, in saying: 
" ... As already pointed out, one of the main 
purposes of the legislature as expressed in the 
strutute is to restrict the proceeding to the actual 
litigants and their witnesses and to prohibit 
either side from using a representative advocate 
such as an attorney. To allow one of the litigants 
in such action to gain the advantage of legal rep-
resentation in the manner here attempted would 
contravene the clear purpose and intent of such 
statute. That cannot be permitted." 
So thus we have the court of California declaring that 
corporations not only may enter the small claims courts, 
by their regular employees, informed on the subject mat-
ter before the court, but in addition, that the corporation 
cannot be represented by a licensed attorney The Cali-
fornia statute is a great deal like the organic act in Utah, 
and ours might even have been taken from that state. 
The issue is far deeper than preserving to the legal 
profession possible business for lawyers. If the small 
13 
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claims court system is to remain workable, then the 
small litigant must be protected in his "personal" right 
to claim and defend, informally. To force the corpora-
tion to use counsel would put the defendant to his cau-
tion to likewise get counsel, in which case, the real pur-
pose of the small claims procedure is defeated for the 
benefit of the legal profession. 
Certainly the Bar of California is presumed to have 
been alert to the statutory enactment that cut lawyers 
off from small claims business, but that prohibition 
passed that legislature, and was upheld by a unanimous 
Court! It is for this splendid holding that we are willing 
to say that the prime interest to be protected is the 
public, and its confidence in the courts, and not the limit-
ed interest of attorneys to a field in which their function 
is demonstrated as of doubtful value. 
This excellent decision upheld the right of the cor-
poration to use the small claims court, and deprived the 
lawyer of entry therein. If that case is authority, it 
disposes on rational grounds of the main part of this 
appeal. The Utah statute does not in terms prohibit 
attorneys. We do not argue here that attorneys should 
be kept out of that court. \Ve simply sa~T that if a cor-
poration does not wish to use counseL it certainly should 
not be required to use a la,vyer. To engraft into the 
statute a requirement that eorporations use an attorney 
is at once to place the opposite party at a disadvantage, 
and force resort to like counsel, in which ease, the entire 
theory of the small claims court is defeated. The pro-
cedures ought to remain informal. The excellent dis-
14 
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cussion in the Prudential case is appellant's best argu-
ment, without reproducing its many elements here. 
The annotation following the Prudential case at 167 
ALR 827 states the core purpose of small claims courts 
as follows: 
"The purpose of these courts is to provide a 
speedy hearing at low cost to the litigants and 
by virtue of the procedural innovations which 
have, to a great degree, minimized the techni-
calities usually confront~ng ~and confounding the 
parties involved in a legal dispute, the purpose 
seems to have been accomplished. The unpre-
cedented informality of the hearings has made 
it possible for a court of this nature to adjudi-
cate a maximum of claims in a minimum of time 
and, as there has been no abandonment of the 
rules of substantive law, with an apparent legal 
sufficiency." 
"In an effort to reach the ultimate in non-
technical proceedings some jurisdictions have by 
legislative fiat or rule of court excluded attorneys 
from these hearings. The neeessity or advisa-
bility of this step, limiting participating in the 
adjudication of small claims to the immediate 
parties, is an open question and this annotation 
does not purport to give answers thereto." 
The annotation note at page 829 states that in the 
following states no attorney is allowed to appear: 
California 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
North Dakota 
15 
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In Michigan attorneys may not appear, but a per-
sonal representative may appear for the corporation. 
By the consent of the court, attorneys may appear 
in Oregon, Washington, Iowa. In the Municipal Court 
of the District of Columbia, the pleadings inform de-
fendant that he may come with or without counsel. Note 
what the annotation says about Utah: (page 829) 
"And the provisions of the Utah Code (title 
20, c 52 #7) although not specifically barring at-
torney are said to be similar in purport to #117 g 
of the California ·Code of Civil Procedure." 
In the case at bar, let it be well remembered that 
Harris, the person signing and filing the affidavit, and 
appearing as a witness, and doing all that was done on 
behalf of the corporate Hi-Land, was its credit manager. 
(R. 63) There can be no doubt but that he was "a bona 
fide employee," the person best informed, whose "duties 
give him peculiar knowledge of the facts of such cases," 
to quote the criteria of the Prudential decision. 
Appellant Harris "followed his instructions" mean-
ing the clerk of the Murray Small Claims c·ourt, R. 52) 
who referred to said credit manager to the proper form, 
(R. 56) instructing how to fill it out. The garnishee 
·execution was prepared by the clerk. (R. 57) Harris 
testified under cross-examination : 
"I am not a lawyer, Mr. Bell. I don't know 
the technicalities of the law." (R. 66) 
Harris followed the procedures of Cy Gallagher 
who was credit manager ahead of himself, and who was 
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on a semi-retired status as assistant credit manager. 
(R. 68, 80) 
As to the appellant Hi-Land's use and experience 
with attorneys in small claims actions, the witness 
Harris modestly stated : 
"Q. Have you used attorneys in the collection 
of Hi-Land Dairy bills generally~ 
A. No 
Q. Why7 
A. With all respect to the legal profession, we 
have not found their service too satisfac-
tory . . . It is not economically sound in all 
cases. We have to locate the individual and 
act on them immediately, otherwise we lose 
them ... we found that there is a delay if 
we use legal counsel . . . from the fact that 
legal counsel does not know each individual 
account as much as we do and this would re-
sult in a delay in this explanation and any 
papers that had to be made out. (R. 69) ... 
Well, the lawyer would have to make out 
papers, file them and this results in a delay 
in acting upon these affairs . . . important 
... it is because these accounts in most cases 
are with people who move around from job 
to job, from residence to residence, and when 
we find them we have to act now." (R. 69, 70) 
The record shows that Warwick C. Lamoreaux, the 
writer of this brief, has been for a long number of years 
general counsel for appellant Hi-Land, and that the 
witness had discussed procedures with the writer, and 
Hi-Land was simply following the advice of its counsel. 
17 
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(R. 71, 79) The witness expressly stated he had never 
"held himself out as a lawyer or practicing law." (R. 73) 
The Utah statute aims at "dispensing speedy jus-
tice" (78-6-8), and in that connection, counsel for re-
spondent summed up the question : 
"Q. Mr. Harris, the primary things that you 
have been able to accomplish in prosecuting 
these matters is that it enabled the company 
to move swiftly and act now, I believe that 
is the primary benefit~ 
A. Yes." (R. 79) 
Cy Galagher, the assistant credit manager at the 
time of the litigation at bar, and with longer experience 
with Hi-Land's problems, testified: 
"We tried the Salt Lake Small Claims Court 
with you (Lamoreaux) as attorney. It took half 
a day to get a judgment and it doesn't pay ... 
We have a lot of - not one or two but hundreds 
of small claims . . . We file those in the Small 
Claims Court that ·w .. e can't get any other way 
and they amount to ten, fifteen a month some-
t . 1 " rmes . . . ess ... more. 
"Q. Now, is it important to the Dairy that it have 
access to the Small Claims Court~? 
A. Otherwise "~e just eouldn't get our money 
. . . Because these are the type of people 
that "'ill not pay unless you have the power 
of the court behind you to make them pay. 
Q. N o"\\r is it easy for you to get counsel to help 
in these s1nall clailn collections' 
A. It's been difficult because they are very 
small. It is on a contingent basis and some-
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times if you have located them once, they 
move again and you do not get them again. 
It is a waste of time." (R. 81, 82) 
While appellant Harris was testifying, the court 
sustained an objection on the question of Hi-Land's 
experience in sending a batch of small collections to 
attorneys. Counsel for appellant made the following 
proffer of proof: 
"The witness, if he were allowed to testify 
on this, would testify that it has been the exper-
ience of Hi-Land Dairy in sending batches of 
collection matters to attorneys that the attorneys 
will try and make collections. They will succeed 
and make reports with respect to the larger 
claims, but as to the smaller claims, after the 
passage of several months, the claim goes back 
to the Dairy and then time has passed .and it 
involves great difficulty for the Association to 
relocate and collect these small bills." (R. 7 4) 
Before we return to the authorities to apply them 
to the above undisputed fact situation before this and 
the lower court, may we remind that app,ellant Hi-Land 
could not possibly be alone in this problem of effecting 
collection of numerous small amounts from ambulant 
debtors who learn the art of keep·ing on the move. True 
the witnesses were when they said that people move, 
and that attorneys are not quick to follow leads. How 
can a competent attorney give real attention to a col-
lection of $10.00 or $30.00. The writer has gone through 
this problem for twenty years with appellant. When 
the proffer of proof was made by him he knows, with 
every other attorney, that the better cases, higher in 
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amount, are preferred, and that the small ones are re-
turned "after the birds have flown," when it is too late 
for the credit manager to do a quick, effective job of 
obtaining "justice." There is no speedy justice avail-
able to plaintiffs in the record at bar. The corporation 
that sells milk, the gas company, the grocer, anyone 
having small amounts in great numbers to collect -
are at the mercy of busy lawyers, and the proof is be-
fore this court that the best means available is their 
own credit department, not working on a contingency, 
but with the sole interest of the claimant, and without 
the necessity to bow to legal nicety. The small claims 
court is the answer to that prayer. It does not take 
anything real away from the busy, competent attorney. 
It is too important to leave to the young lawyer fresh 
out of law school, who has to learn by trial and error, 
and during the learning, the corporate creditor gets lost. 
The Utah statute does not need a narrow construction 
that will deprive corporations of the remedy this mod-
ern procedural innovation offers. But let us turn again 
to the authorities. 
Massachusetts has ever been a leader in judicial 
procedures, and its Supreme Court made important law 
in the leading case of !Ic LAUGHLIN v. MUNICIPAL 
COURT, 32 NE 2d, 266, 1951. There the plaintiff 
brought an action in the s1nall claims court having 
statutef' not different in any important particular from 
lTtah. He appeared "~thout counsel. Defendant ap-
peared 'vith counsel. When the attorney became prolix 
the court took t11e case into its own hands, examined 
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the witness, took active charge of the case and found 
for plaintiff. Defendant appealed, and the high court 
exhaustively treated the question of whether attorneys 
had the right to conduct litigation in small claims courts 
there. It held that the matter lay within the sound dis-
cretion of the court, and that the special procedures in 
small claims were aimed to be "simple, informal, and 
inexpensive." "The statute 'was intended to afford the 
court full power to prevent its being used contrary to 
the purposes of its enactment." 
"This principle does not prevent the presid-
ing judge in a case under the small claim proce-
dure from taking active charge of the proceedings 
and examining witnesses. Even under fonnal 
procedure the judge 'ought to be always the 
guiding spirit and the controlling mind at a 
t . l'" na. . .. 
"The statute relating to small claims p·ro-
cedure, however, contemplates if necessary more 
active participation of the judge in the conduct 
of the hearing than is usual under formal pro-
cedure. Obviously it was intended by the statute 
to provide a form of hearing in which assistance 
of parties by counsel would not be required, 
since it was contemplated that in many, if not 
most, cases the parties would not be so assisted. 
Indeed, in the present case, the plaintiff was not 
assisted by counsel . . . The defendant could not, 
by being represented by counsel, change the es-
sential nature of the hearing to which he had 
assented ... 
"Neither the statute nor the rule expressly 
forbids examination of witnesses by counsel . . . 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"But we are of opinion that a judge under 
the small claims procedure has a wide discretion 
with respect to the extent of participation by 
counsel in a hearing.'' 
May it he kept in mind that defendant-respondent 
Tuttle appeared in the small claims court below, was 
sworn, admitted he owed the bill, put himself on the 
mercy of the court, asked for the privilege of paying 
for the milk in two installments. (R. 32, 51). He did not 
object to the procedure. It was only when an attorney 
outside the case failed to intimidate the appellants, 
(R. 29, 30, 59) that collateral attack was instituted in 
an attempt to rob Hi-Land of the recovery for the milk 
already consumed by the debtor who had not made timely 
objection to the procedure! And note that the appeal 
is not even designed to get the money back for the poor 
defendant! The drawing of the findings are intended 
to pay the attorney only for ti)ing to make slow, tedious, 
and unsuccessful, the creditor's use of the small claims 
court. (R. 90) ~fr. Tuttle took bankruptcy! (R. 59) 
Shall this court make the procedure informal, inexpen-
sive, speedy~ Or shall it require the old procedures of 
formality, and that appellants found did not serve them 
well~ The ~IcLaughlin rase is excellent. The court 
ought to follo'v it, ren1e1nbering that lTtah procedure 
al]o,vs the defendant to appeal, ''ith attorney fees to 
thP prevailing part~~. 78-6-10 lTC_._.\_ 1953 This is one of 
the rare places '""here n ttorney fees are granted in the 
ahsPnce of agree1nent. This court n1ight find relevance 
in the a.'varding of appellate attorney fees as the price 
of kePping attorJH?~~s out of the original proceeding. 
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At any rate, the enumeration of states that absolutely 
preclude attorneys from entering the small claims pro-
ceedings ought to caution this court from establishing 
a rule that under the silent Utah statute attorneys must 
appear for corp·orations. It will work much mischief 
if this court so affirms. If it reverses, procedural due 
process will have been preserved. If it affirms, appel-
lant will have been substantially deprived of due pro-
cess; it will be required to use a slower, less effective, 
and more expensive procedure that will not permit. it 
to make its collections. Its debtors will escape payment 
by moving ahead of slower procedures we ought not cast 
attention upon. 
The Massachusetts ease places great emphasis on 
the discretion possessed by the trial judge. The record 
at bar is devoid of any abuse of discretion by Judge 
Lawrence E. Nelson who heard the case. The statutory 
procedure was well followed. There could be not the 
slightest criticism of the case down to the entry of 
judgment. Only the technical questions of whether an 
attorney should have been present (and one certainly 
\vas not needed in this case) and garnishment procedures 
are really under attack. 
In the important case of SANDERSON v. NIE-
MANN, 110 P2d 1025 the Supreme ·Court of California 
again stated of the small claims court : 
"The chief characteristics of its proceedings 
are that there are no attorneys, no pleadings 
and no legal rules of evidence ; there are no 
juries, and no formal findings are made on the 
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issues presented. At the hearings the presenta-
tion of evidence may be sharply curtailed, and 
the proceedings are often terminated in a short 
space of time. The awards, although made in 
accordance with substantive law, are often based 
on the application of common sense; and the 
spirit of compromise and conciliation attends the 
proceedings. (cases) 
The Sanderson case supra cites from 1 WIGMORE 
EVIDENC·E, 3rd edition, 1940, section 4d, page 106 
as follows: 
"In small causes generally ... it would be a 
defiance of common sense and a nullification 
of the main purpose, to enforce the jury trial 
rules of evidence ; for the parties are expected to 
appear personally without professi~onal counsel, 
and they cannot be expected to observe rules 
which they do not know." 
We are familiar with the doctrine that under or-
dinary circumstances a corporation cannot appear in 
court except through an attorney. The principles are 
laid down in PARADISE v. NOWLIN, 195 P2d 867 by 
the California court for reference. In that case the court 
found the rule stated; however it made express reference 
to the exception to corporations entering small claims 
courts, where statutory authority so allows, as in PRU-
DENTIAL INSURANCE, v. SMALL CLAIMS COURT, 
supra. 
We must admit that the Utah statute in terms does 
not reach as far, nor is it as explicit, as the California 
statute which prohibits attorneys in small claims courts. 
The current edition of the California statute, with anno-
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tation, is at WE.ST'S ANNO. CALIF. c·ODES, Civil 
Procedure, vol. 13, at page 166, under section 117g. 
We believe there is more than ample authority in 
the Utah statute for this court to construe the small 
claims act as permitting a corporation to proceed pro-
pria persona, not through an attorney. As before stated, 
"any person" may app·ear and execute the affidavit 
under 78-6-2. For constitutional, due-process purposes, 
a corporation has been shown, supra, to be entitled to 
the privileges of natural persons, and be subject to the 
same obligations. The corporation could only appear 
through one of its knowledgeable agents such as its 
credit manager. The statute turns in 78-6-3 to the 
language of "claimant" which is impersonal and never 
uses the word "person" again. In 78-6-4 "the justice 
or judge or clerk shall inform the p.Zaintiff of the time 
fixed and order him to appear at said time and to have 
with him his books, papers and witnesses necessary to 
prove his claim. When Harris came, how could he be 
practicing law~ This could apply both to the p-ersonal 
litigant and to the corporation. In 78-6-3 the court or 
clerk may draft the affidavit that the "claimant" shall 
sign, which shows that if the claimant is appearing by 
a layman the judge or clerk may prepare the affidavit. 
"The plaintiff and defendant shall have the right to 
offer evidence in their behalf by witnesses appearing 
at such hearing. The justice or court may give judg-
ment and make such orders as to time of payments as 
may, by him, be deemed to be right and just.'' So says 
78-6-7, which affirms the informal procedure, shorn of 
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technicalities. The procedural terms of "right and just" 
do not fit the cloth cut by trained attorneys. Indeed, the 
next section, quoted supra, is the "sole object to dis-
pensing speedy justice between the parties" - clause, 
and short-cuts the red-tape and technical procedures 
that lawyers bring to the forum. The fee for filing is 
cut to $1.50 by 78-6-14. 
Certainly this court must wrestle with the basic 
p·rocedural problems that have been faced by the Calif-
ornia Legislature and many courts. It will be no dis-
grace to the legal profession for this court to find that 
as used in the small claims act, and none other, that 
"person" means corporation, and that a corporation 
is not precluded from sending an informed p-erson to 
that court to achieve speedy justice. Where as here, 
the plaintiff-corporation seeks the small claims forum, 
that is the end of its remedy unless the defendant files 
a counterclaim; it cannot appeal! (78-6-10) The cor-
poration gives up something important for its right to 
enter the expeditious small claims forum; the defendant 
does not. It would he an imposition on the other side 
to require the corporation to bring counsel. It is a re-
markable procedural advance affirmed by California 
and Massachusetts, that this court ought to follow. 
The trial court should be reversed in finding that 
a corporation need have counsel, and that its credit 
manger practiced law in signing the affidavit and testi-
fying. He made no argument. It is clear the court 
directed every stage of the proceeding, as the statute 
allowed it, and the clerk under its direction, to do. After 
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all, justice was done. Tuttle owed the money; confessed 
he did; he agreed with the court to pay, and then failed. 
Speedy justice has been done; no injustice or bad, ques-
tionable procedure was pointed to except some of the 
informality wiped out at pretrial. 
We move now to garnishment. 
II 
THE COURT ERR.ED IN ENJOINING A SMALL CLAIMS 
COURT FROM ISSUING A GAR.NISHMENT. 
The trial court concluded that "The small claims 
division of the Murray City Court does not have power 
to issue a garnishment out of its small claims division ... " 
(R. 90) In its judgment the same court was enjoined 
from so doing. There is thus raised another major issue 
that this court must resolve. 
Be it remembered that whereas the small claims 
courts in Tooele, Richfield, Moab, Ogden, and Murray 
all allow garnishments to issue after judgment, the same 
courts in Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah do not. (R.75) 
Hence there is a serious conflict in the construction of 
pertinent statutes and n1les, and appellants .argue that 
to preclude the Murray small claims court in this pro-
ceeding from issuing a garnishment after judgment is 
a denial of due process, and deprives app,ellants of equal 
protection of the law. 
The Murray court regularly issues garnishments 
after judgment. (R. 30) The procedures were estab-
lished by the judge of that court. (R. 46) 
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The issue comes up under the conflict between 78-6-8 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64 D(b) (2). 
The said statute concludes: 
"No att~achment or garnishment shall vssue 
from the small claims court, but execut~on may 
issue in the manner prescribed by law upon the 
payment of the fees allowed by law for such 
services." 
Thus, on its face, the statute says the small claims court 
cannot issue a garnishment, but it also says that it may 
issue an execution, and we argue that if an execution 
may issue, this will include all of the elements of a 
garnishment. 
The real answer 1s not in a construction of the 
above section, but in the repeal of that alleged prohi-
bition under the following text of Rule 64D (b) (2): 
"(2) AFTER JUDGMENT. After the entry 
of judgment, the clerk of any court from which 
execution thereon may issue shall, upon request 
of the judgment creditor, issue a writ of garnish-
ment and no affidavit or undertaking shall be 
necessary as a condition therefor." 
The Murray Small Cairns Court has construed this rule 
as a repeal of the earlier statutory prohibition. (R. 30) 
So we come head on to the conflict in the interpreta-
tion of the statute and the rule, and this court has juris-
diction to settle the controversy. Technically this is not 
an appeal from a proceeding in a city or justice court, 
for the immediate action was a collateral attack on the 
small claims judgment. Under rule 72 (a) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, this court gets its jurisdiction 
in any event because the validity and constitutionality 
of the statute and n1le above in conflict must be con-
strued by this court. 
Every condition of Rule 64D (b) (2) has been met 
in the case at bar: The garnishment was issued by the 
court after judgment. The words of the rule above state 
that ANY COURT may issue the garnishment. This 
would embrace the small claims court; but the proviso 
follovvs that "any court from which execution thereon 
may be issued," and for this, let us go to the organic 
act on small claims courts, and it expressly allows the 
court to issue an execution. So that in terms, the rule 
nullifies the former prohibition agains garnishment out 
of the small claims court, and it clearly pennits any 
court, which would include the small claims court, pro-
vided the court in question has power to issue an execu-
tion. Hence, the Judge and appellant Clerk of the Mur-
ray Small Claims Court thus took their authority to 
issue the garnishments, after judgment, such as the one 
at bar. 
It is noted that Judge Jeppson in the pretrial order 
held that in his opinion "the Small Claims Court can 
legally issue garnishments." (R. 18) 
Just how did the strange words get into the organic 
small cairns act~ Eary in the history of these procedural 
innovations there might have been a good reason to 
preclude garnishments, but we find no rational thereon, 
and we have looked. We would like to suggest, apart 
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from the Utah rule on the subject, that any court that 
has power to issue an execution, and does so, puts into 
the power of the judgment creditor all of the powers 
incident to garnishment, and more. In other words, may 
it not be said that an execution embraces all of the 
powers by which a judgment for money may be liqui-
dated or realized~ Why does not an execution embrace 
a garnishment~ At 4 Am. J ur. 552 at 553 it is said of 
an attachment, ahead of judgment: "When the prop-
erty of the debtor has thus been levied upon, it is con-
served for eventual execut~on after the action shall 
have pToceeded to judgment ... " On page 553 the same 
authority says of garnishment: 
"The term 'garnishment' as used today means 
a proceeding or process whereby the property, 
money, or credits of one p.erson, generally called 
the 'debtor' and in the possession of, or owing 
by, another, generally designated the 'garnishee' 
are applied to the payment of the debt of the 
debtor by means of process issuing against the 
debtor and the garnishee." 
Is property in the hands of a third party, belonging 
to the defendant-judgment-debtor unavailable on exe-
cution~ We doubt that. The subject of execution is 
elaborately treated in Rule 69 of the Utah Rules, and 
all of these powers were available to appellant Hi-Land 
to satisfy its judgment. Attention to the "Garnishee 
Execution" by the court sho''Ts that the essential requi-
sites of an execution 'vere present. This document refers 
to the judgment; it states the court issuing the same 
(although the small claims division thereof is not ex-
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pressly stated . . . an example of the informality of 
that court) and that the judgment is for money, and the 
a1nount thereof, to wit, $50.18. It directs a levy on the 
unexempted personal property of the defendant, and in 
effect this was done. True it did not require a sale to 
convert the personal property into cash, and the cash 
was taken on the garnishee execution to satisfy the debt. 
We do not believe this court need construe all of 
the tedious provisions of the execution rules unless it 
wants to. The court ought to predicate its disposition 
of this part of the case at bar by simply stating that 
Rule 64 D (b) (2) rep·ealed the former p·rohibition, and 
that thereunder, a small claims court is one of the courts 
allowed, after judgment, to issue garnishments. To do 
otherwise is to cut down the efficiency and exp~edition 
of the small claims courts; make them technical, slow-
moving, and ineffective; making it easy for judgment 
debtors to escape the payment of their debts, and re-
quiring technical nicety to take the place of informal, 
speedy justice, from which there is ever a right of 
appeal to defendants unjustly dealt with. 
Certainly this court should not go back to the cum-
bersome procedures of the past and find that garnish-
ment may not issue until after an execution is filed, as 
in MILFORD BANK v. MURD·O·CK 65 P2d 627. The 
new rule 64 D· (b) (2) has done away with this. There 
should be no question but that after judgment, the judg-
ment-creditor may apply at once for the garnishment 
with no requirement of an affidavit or undertaking. 
There should be no deviation from the essential pro-
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cedures followed in the case at bar, except for infor-
Inalities that might be commented upon, in order to 
establish a more orderly procedure. To require the 
judgment creditor to take the route of execution would 
be slow, cumbersome, and unprogressive. Garnishment 
after judgment meets the test of due process to the 
debtor; he is not injured at all thereby. The tools of 
quick garnishment in small claims are necessary and 
essential to collection of small amounts. To encumber 
the procedure with technicalities, set aside by the new 
rule, would rob the small claims court of the quick 
remedy intended by the organic statute, amended by 
this new rule. 
There is no good and valid reason why Salt Lake 
City and Provo small claims courts ought to cling to 
old procedures. ·Courts, particularly of the kind under 
scrutiny must find procedures that will increase the 
respect of the public therefor, not bog them down with 
technicalities that make informal function impossible. 
The result in the Murray court hurt no one. The man 
who bought the milk ought to pay for it; the injured 
seller, acting through its credit manager, ought to have 
a clear and quick way of getting at any or all of the 
proper assets of the debtor after judgment, without 
obstruction. We believe the courts, debtors, and the 
public will lose nothing of real value by adhering to 
the practice of the Murray court. Indeed, if all small 
claims courts are given direction in this decision, col-
lections of small claims will he facilitated, and that is 
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the business of the bench and bar m this declaratory 
proceeding. 
While we do not predicate our argument on the 
cumbersome procedures of execution, we ask the court 
to note Rule 69 (i) which authorizes a garnishee to pay 
the judgment creditor. And let it also be born in mind, 
if the question comes up., that there is no issue on ap-
pellant taking exempt property. Respondent has never 
raised that issue; and it is too late now. 
Attention is called to Rule 81 (a) : 
"These rules shall apply to all special stat-
utory proceedings except insofar as such rules 
are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where 
a statute provides for procedure by reference 
to any part of the former Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules." 
We submit that the small claims statute, and 78-6-8 
in particular, refers to the former Code of Civil Pro-
cedure in respect to executions, and thereby, the above 
rule makes the procedural, statutory prohibition against 
garnishment inop·erative. It has clearly been amended 
by Rule 64 D (b) (2). 
Rule 81 (c) makes the rules apply to city and jus-
tice courts, and thereby they expressly apply to the 
small claims courts. The rule under crucial examination 
is clearly applicable, and expressly addresses itself to 
"all courts," which includes small claims courts that 
have powers of execution. 
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The injunction issued by the District Court against 
the Murray Small Claims Court in the issuance of gar-
nishments after judgment, must be declared to be error, 
and reversed. 
III 
THE COU·RT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO 
RESPONDENT FOR $50.18 AND COSTS. 
If this court finds that small claims courts may be 
entered by corporations, and that their bona fide repre-
sentatives do not practice law in making the affidavit 
and testifying, and seeking to collect small amounts; 
and in addition, that garnishments may issue under the 
rules of this court as an amendment to the small claims 
act, then it follows that the judgment given in the Mur-
ray Small Claims court to appellant Hi-Land ought to 
stand as collected. 
We deem no special argument need be made hereon. 
We respectfully request this court to reverse the 
trial court and find a procedure that will allow corpora-
tions to do small collections without resort to technical-
ities, counsel, and with the right to immediate garnish-
ment after judgment. 
Respectfully, 
WARWICK C. LAJ\JOREAUX, 
ROBERT REES DANSIE, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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